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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this action brought pursuant to the Fair Housing Act, 
42 U.S.C. S 3604, The Fair Housing Council of Suburban 
Philadelphia ("FHC") appeals an order of the district court 
granting a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
filed by Acme Newspapers, Inc. ("Acme"), its publication, 
The Main Line Times, and the paper's publisher. The district 
court granted this motion based on its conclusion that the 
FHC lacked standing under Article III of the United States 
Constitution to maintain this suit. Because we agree that 
the FHC failed to establish any "perceptible impairment" to 
its operation caused by the alleged discrimination and thus 
failed to satisfy the minimum standing requirements 
 
                                3 
  
embodied in Article III, we will affirm the order of the 
district court. 
 
I. 
 
The FHC, a fair housing group which has operated in the 
Philadelphia area for more than forty years, describes itself 
as a non-profit organization whose "purpose is to educate 
and promote fair housing and to oppose segregation based 
on the protected classes found in the Fair Housing Act of 
1968, as amended." 
 
On February 21, 1996, the FHC filed eleven lawsuits in 
federal court, nine of which charged various newspaper 
publishers and related defendants with violations of the 
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. S 3604.1  In this suit, the FHC 
sought damages for injuries alleged to have been caused by 
real estate advertisements placed in the Main Line Times on 
a number of occasions during 1994 and 1995. In its 
complaint, the FHC alleged that: 
 
       On or about December, 1994 through at least 
       November, 1995, defendants approved and published 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. 42 U.S.C. S 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful: 
 
       To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or 
       published any notice, statement, or advertisement with respect to 
       the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, 
       limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, 
       handicap, familial status, or national origin or an intention to 
make 
       any such preference, limitation, or discrimination. 
 
The Act provides that "an aggrieved person may commence a civil action 
in an appropriate United States district court . . ..", S 3613(a)(1)(4), 
and 
defines an "aggrieved person" (including corporations and associations) 
as: 
 
       Any person who-- 
 
       (1) claims to have been injured by a discriminator y housing 
       practice; or 
 
       (2) believes that such person will be injured by a  discriminatory 
       housing practice that is about to occur. 
 
Section 3602(I). 
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       real estate advertisements that stated "no children," 
       "three persons," as well as, upon information and 
       belief, many other advertisements which indicated a 
       preference or limitation on the basis of familial status. 
 
The case was tried before a jury in December, 1996. At 
that time, five advertisements were at issue. These 
advertisements contained the following allegedly 
discriminatory phrases 1) "no children;" 2)  "3 persons;" 
3) "ideal for couple or professional single;" 4) "(for one 
person);" and 5) "(for one person)." At t he close of all the 
evidence, Acme and the other defendants filed a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. 
Acme contended that the FHC had failed to establish injury 
sufficient to satisfy the standing requirement imposed by 
Article III of the United States Constitution. The district 
court deferred ruling on this motion and submitted the case 
to the jury. 
 
On December 4, 1996, the jury returned a verdict in 
favor of the FHC, awarding the FHC $25,000 in 
compensatory damages. On December 17, 1996, Acme 
renewed its Rule 50 motion, again arguing that the FHC 
lacked standing to pursue its claims under the Fair 
Housing Act. The district court granted this renewed 
motion on January 28, 1997, stating that it had"acted 
prematurely in submitting the case to the jury as[the FHC] 
did not have standing to bring any of the claims asserted in 
its Complaint." Fair Housing Council of Suburban 
Philadelphia v. Main Line Times, No. 96-1379, 1997 WL 
30642 at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan 27, 1997). This timely appeal 
followed. 
 
II. 
 
This appeal requires that we revisit, albeit in a different 
context, the identical issue raised in Fair Housing Council of 
Suburban Philadelphia v. Montgomery Newspapers, No. 
97-1051 (3d Cir. March 31, 1998): whether the FHC has 
shown "distinct and palpable" injury sufficient to satisfy 
Article III standing requirements under the Fair Housing 
Act. Resolution of this question turns on the application of 
constitutional standing requirements. We reviewed the 
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parameters of these requirements at length in our opinion 
in Montgomery Newspapers, and will not repeat that 
discussion here. 
 
We begin our examination of the issue before us by 
noting that Article III principles governing standing are by 
now well-settled. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wild Life, 540 
U.S. 555, 560, the Supreme Court summarized the law of 
standing as follows: 
 
       Over the years, our cases have established that the 
       irreducible constitutional minimum of standing 
       contains three elements. First the plaintiff must have 
       suffered an "injury in fact" -- an invasion of a legally 
       protected interest which is a) concrete and 
       particularized, and b) "actual or imminent, not 
       `conjectural' or `hypothetical.' " Second, there must be 
       a causal connection between the injury and the 
       conduct complained of -- the injury has to be"fairly 
       . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the 
       defendant and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent 
       action of some third party not before the court." Third, 
       it must be "likely" as opposed to merely "speculative," 
       that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable 
       decision." 
 
(Citations omitted.) These requirements -- particularly the 
need for injury in fact -- were applied in the fair housing 
context in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 
378-79 (1982). There, the Supreme Court wrote that: 
 
       In determining whether [a fair housing organization] 
       has standing under the Fair Housing Act, we conduct 
       the same inquiry as in the case of an individual: Has 
       the plaintiff " `alleged such a personal stake in the 
       outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his 
       invocation of federal court jurisdiction"? . . . If, as 
       broadly alleged, petitioner's practices have perceptibly 
       impaired [the organization]'s ability to provide 
       counseling and referral services for low- and moderate- 
       income homeseekers, there can be no question that the 
       organization has suffered injury in fact. Such concrete 
       and demonstrable injury to the organization's activities 
       -- with the consequent drain on the organization's 
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       resources -- constitutes far more than simply a 
       setback to the organization's abstract social interests. 
 
455 U.S. at 378-79 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
The caselaw establishes that in order to defeat the motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the FHC was 
required to submit "evidence showing through specific facts 
. . . that . . . it [was] `directly' affected [by the alleged 
discrimination]." Lujan v. Defenders of Wild Life, 540 U.S. 
at 562 (emphasis added). "Since [the elements of standing] 
are not mere pleading requirements but rather an 
indispensable part of the plaintiff's case, each element must 
be supported in the same way as any other matter on 
which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e. with the 
manner and degree of evidence required at the successive 
stages of the litigation." Id. at 561. Despite the jury verdict 
in the FHC's favor, the district court concluded that the 
FHC failed to meet its burden of proof, producing nothing 
of substance at trial to support the damage allegations set 
forth in the complaint.2 There was no "evidence upon which 
the jury could properly find a verdict for [the FHC]." 
Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d 
Cir. 1993). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The complaint contains the following allegations bearing on injury: 
 
       9. [E]ach act of discrimination conducted in  the Delaware Valley 
       causes a setback to the good work accomplished by the FHC's 
       educational and outreach efforts and to the development of an 
       integrated housing community. As a result, the FHC must launch 
       further efforts to undo the damage that the discrimination has 
       caused. In the case of widespread and broadly disseminated 
       discrimination, such as occurs in the ongoing publication of a 
       landlord's discriminatory advertisements, the further efforts 
required 
       are a substantial drain on its resources and harms[sic] the FHC. 
 
       18. As a result of the conduct of the Defendants, persons were 
       injured in their person and property. Specifically, families with 
       children were barred from housing in violation of the Fair Housing 
       Act of 1968 as amended. Further, the FHC is now forced to divert 
       funds to counteract the discriminatory message and acts of 
       Defendants, and has had its purpose frustrated by Defendants' 
       discriminatory conduct. 
 
These damage allegations are identical to those set forth in the complaint 
filed in Fair Housing Council v. Montgomery Newspapers. 
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Judgment as a matter of law is to be granted sparingly. 
We will affirm an order granting judgment as a matter of 
law "only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair 
and reasonable inference . . . it is apparent that the verdict 
is not supported by legally sufficient evidence." Id. We have 
carefully reviewed the FHC's damage allegations and the 
evidence introduced to support them and are convinced 
that this is one of those rare cases where, following a jury 
verdict, judgment as a matter of law was warranted. 
 
III. 
 
The FHC alleges that it suffered impairment sufficient to 
establish Article III standing when it was forced to divert 
resources from counseling and other activities to: (1) an 
investigation designed to determine the existence and 
extent of on-going discrimination in advertising; 
(2) litigation; and (3) an educational campaign  designed to 
counteract the discriminatory effect of the advertisements. 
We considered and rejected identical damage claims based 
on the need to divert funds to investigation and litigation in 
Montgomery Newspapers. As the "proof" offered on these 
issues is virtually identical to that offered and found 
lacking in Montgomery Newspapers, we need not detail that 
proof or repeat our analysis here. 
 
Because, however, the evidence regarding the need for an 
educational campaign to counteract the alleged 
discrimination differs somewhat from that offered in 
Montgomery Newspapers, we address it briefly. At trial, the 
FHC's Executive Director sought to establish that the FHC 
had suffered injury sufficient to satisfy Article III by offering 
the following testimony: 
 
       For [forty years, the FHC] educates. We go out to all 
       kinds of organizations, groups . . . and educate them 
       about their rights to obtain housing on a non- 
       discriminatory basis. We also spend a tremendous 
       amount of time educating the industry. . . . So, when 
       these ads appear in the paper and even if it's only one 
       ad, it sort of undoes -- not sort of, it definitely undoes 
       all that good work, all that hard work, all that 
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       education. Its back to where we started from. It's as 
       though we never did this. It's broadcast to tens of 
       thousands of people. First of all, people see it and 
       think that they could be turned down for housing. 
       Other Realtors, landlords, see this, think either the 
       laws don't exist or they're not enforced. We havefiled 
       complaints against people and they've come to us with 
       dozens of ads from the newspaper that say, look, here's 
       ads that say not children, no children, adults only, 
       adults preferred, perfect for single. And they say, well, 
       what's wrong? This is in the newspaper. 
 
       Q. Are you talking about people you've charged? 
 
       A. Yes. 
 
       Q. Okay. 
 
       A. -- people that we have filed complaints against. 
 
       Q. Like who? 
 
       A. Individual landlords . . . . So our job is to educate. 
       And all this education goes down the drain when 
       these ads appear in the paper. 
 
While we can agree intuitively that continued publication 
of discriminatory advertising in general could have an 
adverse effect on public perception, thus making the job of 
the FHC more difficult, we are convinced that even were we 
to assume injury, the evidence submitted failed to establish 
the necessary "causal connection between the injury and 
the [particular advertisements]." Lujan v. Defenders of Wild 
Life, 540 U.S. at 560. 
 
The evidence submitted by the FHC did not show that the 
advertisements at issue created any adverse effects upon 
families seeking housing or upon public perception of the 
advertisements' legality. The evidence offered was probative 
only as to the effect of discriminatory advertising generally 
on landlords and realtors. The testimony offered by the 
FHC with respect to the five specific advertisements failed 
to establish that they had been read by anyone outside the 
FHC or that the FHC was required to modify its operation 
in any way as a result of these advertisements.3 As Acme 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The dissent states that activities "falling between investigation and 
the 
filing of a lawsuit can constitute Article III injury . . . ." (Slip 
Opinion at 
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correctly observes, "No injury to the cause of fair housing -- 
or consequent impairment of the Council's programs -- 
could follow from the publication of advertising which was 
only proven to have been observed by persons who knew 
that it was illegal, i.e. the Council's staff members." 
 
IV. 
 
Faced with the difficulties inherent in its evidence, the 
FHC takes the position that, because it holds the status of 
a private attorney general, it need show nothing more than 
a violation of the Act in order to establish Article III 
standing. We disagree. The fact that a housing organization 
is able to show that a particular advertisement violates the 
Act is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article III; 
a violation of the Act does not automatically confer standing 
on any plaintiff, even one who holds the status of a private 
attorney general. An organization acting as a private 
attorney general is relieved only of prudential limitations on 
standing and may bring suit to enforce the rights of others 
only where the organization itself is able to demonstrate that 
it has suffered injury in fact. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572-73 
(requiring that an organization holding status of private 
attorney general show injury in fact). The required 
demonstration of legally cognizable injury is absent in this 
case. Although we have given serious consideration to the 
jury's verdict and award of compensatory damages in favor 
of the FHC, our analysis of the record compels us, 
nonetheless, to conclude that the record is devoid of 
"evidence upon which the jury could properly [have found 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15). The dissent concludes that the FHC suffered such an injury when 
it devoted resources to holding a press conference "to publicize the 
newspaper's violation of the Fair Housing Act." Id. The testimony of an 
FHC representative establishes that this "press conference was held to 
announce the filing of [eleven] lawsuits . .. so that we could get the 
message out . . . that the type of ads that appear in the Main Lines 
Times . . . are in violation of the Fair Housing Act." We have not found 
any case which has held that a press conference announcing the filing 
of lawsuits might be sufficient to establish Article III injury. To adopt 
this 
radical view of injury would effectively nullify the Article III standing 
requirement. 
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a] verdict for [the FHC]." Lightning Lube, Inc., 4 F.3d at 
1166. 
 
V. 
 
In concluding that the strictures of Article III bar the FHC 
from maintaining this suit, we emphasize here, as we did in 
Montgomery Newspapers, that the goal of "eliminating 
discrimination in housing is vitally important." (Slip 
Opinion at 18.) Even this laudable objective does not, 
however, warrant an evisceration of Article III. As Acme 
points out: 
 
       [T]he most impassioned public policy arguments 
       cannot eliminate the case or controversy requirement 
       from the Constitution. If anything, the appeal to public 
       policy should highlight . . . the separation of powers 
       rationale from which the case or controversy doctrine 
       flows. Adjudicating actual controversies, not legislating 
       social policy, is the province of the judiciary. 
 
Our adherence to the requirements of Article III should 
not impede vigorous enforcement of the Fair Housing Act. 
The caselaw is replete with examples of housing 
organizations which have successfully established injury 
sufficient to carry them over the Article III threshold. As we 
observed in Montgomery Newspapers, "It should not be 
insurmountably difficult for these organizations to establish 
standing either in their own right or on behalf of their 
members by referring to well-established standing 
principles and adjusting their pleadings and proof 
accordingly." (Slip Opinion at 18.) 
 
VI. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the 
district court. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting 
 
This appeal raises the identical issue presented in Fair 
Housing Council of Suburban Philadelphia v. Montgomery 
Newspapers, No. 97-1051 (3d Cir. 1998). Again, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
The FHC has standing to sue The Main Line Times under 
42 U.S.C. S 3604(c) because it has shown the threshold 
injury that is required under Article III, Section 2 of the 
Constitution. At trial the FHC demonstrated that it must 
redirect resources to an educational campaign to inform 
landlords, real estate agents, housing providers, and 
consumers that discrimination based on family status 
violates 42 U.S.C. S 3604(c). The FHC held a press 
conference to advise, among others, housing providers and 
consumers that the advertisements in The Main Line Times 
violated the Fair Housing Act. The FHC further 
demonstrated the ignorance of housing providers, who 
continue to attempt to submit illegal advertisements, and 
the need for an educational campaign for the housing 
industry and for the defendant itself, who continued to 
publish illegal advertisements and to promote 
misunderstanding about the familial status provisions of 
the Fair Housing Act. The majority mistakenly concludes 
that the FHC has not demonstrated the need for an 
educational campaign. In support of its holding, the 
majority repeats its characterization of the FHC's evidence 
from the Montgomery Newspapers case. As I concluded in 
Montgomery Newspapers, the majority's depiction of the 
evidence is incorrect. The district court concluded that the 
advertisements were not the cause of any programmatic 
changes the FHC may have made. Again, I disagree; the 
FHC is only required to show that its injury is fairly 
traceable to the actions of the defendant. Furthermore, the 
FHC has demonstrated standing for costs incurred 
investigating and applying legal pressure to The Main Line 
Times. The majority does not discuss this as it pertains to 
the evidence submitted in this case; but because it relies on 
its conclusion in the Montgomery Newspapers case, I 
reiterate my disagreement with that conclusion here. 
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I. Standard of Review 
 
This is an exceptional case in which the district court 
granted judgment as a matter of law following a jury verdict 
of $25,000 in favor of the FHC. Generally, courts grant 
judgment as a matter of law sparingly, and give the 
nonmoving party every fair and reasonable inference before 
concluding that the verdict was not supported by legally 
sufficient evidence. Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp.,4 
F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993). The majority misapplies 
this standard, and credits only one passage of testimony in 
support of the FHC's position. We have held that a case is 
properly submitted to a jury unless it is "critically deficient 
of that minimum quantum of evidence from which the jury 
might reasonably afford relief." Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. 
Am., Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 921 (3d Cir. 1986). A review of the 
record plainly reveals sufficient evidence to support a 
verdict in favor of the FHC. 
 
II. Educational Injury 
 
The Supreme Court held in Havens Realty Corp. v. 
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372, 102 S. Ct. 1114, 1121 (1982), 
that the plaintiff organization had standing to sue if the 
activity that allegedly violated the Fair Housing Act 
perceptibly impaired counseling and referral services. This 
impairment meets the "injury in fact" test because a 
concrete and demonstrable drain on resources is a more 
plausible injury than a conjectural "setback" to an 
organization's abstract social interests. Id. at 379 
(distinguishing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 
S. Ct. 1361 (1972)). The courts of appeals interpreting 
Havens agree that diversion of resources to educational 
programs is sufficient to impart Article III standing. See, 
e.g., Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. 
BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1276-77 (D.C. Cir. 1994); 
Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati 
Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1991); Spann v. 
Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1990). An 
"identifiable trifle" of this type of injury will suffice to confer 
standing upon the FHC, even when the proceedings have 
advanced to trial. United States v. Students Challenging 
Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14, 93 
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S. Ct. 2405, 2417 n.14 (1973) (rejecting the argument that 
standing should be limited to those significantly injured, 
and ruling that any level of injury is sufficient to confer 
standing). The FHC has clearly met its burden by showing 
sufficient evidence of injury. 
 
The FHC held a press conference to inform consumers 
and the housing industry that the discriminatory 
advertisements that appeared in The Main Line Times 
violated the Fair Housing Act. Jan Chadwick, Assistant 
Director of the FHC, testified to the detailed plan to educate 
housing providers and consumers about the Fair Housing 
Act's family status provisions, and explained a specific 
proposal for newspaper campaign. The FHC also presented 
evidence of the additional costs associated with the 
newspaper campaign. 
 
The FHC has also shown that its educational plan is a 
necessary response to the discriminatory advertisements 
that appeared in The Main Line Times because individuals 
seeking to place advertisements, as well as those 
responsible for publishing the ads, misunderstood the 
family status provisions of the Fair Housing Act. The illegal 
advertisements at issue in this lawsuit were accepted into 
publication by the trained staff of The Main Line Times 
advertising department. Frequently, individuals placing 
housing advertisements insisted on illegal wording, telling 
newspaper staff members to "take it or leave it," and the 
paper would sometimes have to reject ads because the 
individual placing it refused to comply with the Fair 
Housing Act. The FHC educational plan, and specifically 
the press conference the FHC already held, attempted to 
dispel misconceptions about the Fair Housing Act that 
housing providers might have developed from reading the 
illegal advertisements in The Main Line Times. 
 
III. Investigation Injury 
 
Time spent reviewing the newspaper for illegal housing 
advertisements can constitute Article III injury. Havens 
found "injury in fact" when a fair housing organization had 
to divert resources to "identify and counteract" 
discriminatory practices. 455 U.S. at 379, 102 S. Ct. at 
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1124. Like "educational injury," the courts following 
Havens agree that costs incurred investigating violations of 
the Fair Housing Act can confer standing. See, e.g., Hooker 
v. Weathers, 990 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1993) (costs 
incurred in the investigation to confirm the facts and 
circumstances). 
 
Viewing the evidence of the two alternative Article III 
factors, investigation and litigation injury, there is at least 
a minimum quantum of evidence required to show injury. 
Here, the FHC demonstrated that it diverted resources to 
review The Main Line Times to identify violations of the Fair 
Housing Act. 
 
IV. Litigation Injury 
 
I restate my conclusion from my dissent in Montgomery 
Newspapers that activities falling between investigation and 
the filing of the lawsuit can constitute Article III injury to 
an organization under Havens. My decision to confer 
standing upon fair housing organizations for enforcement 
activities, other than the filing of the lawsuit, does not 
conflict with the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit's 
cases that the majority finds persuasive. Those cases only 
prohibit conferral of standing for the act of filing the 
lawsuit. See Fair Employment Council of Greater 
Washington, Inc. v. BMC Marketing Corp., 28 F.3d 1268 
(D.C. Cir. 1994); Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24 
(D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 
The FHC testified to the activities it had to postpone 
when it dedicated resources to enforcement activities 
arising from The Main Line Times advertisements. (Direct of 
James Berry, J.A. at 208-209.) The FHC chose non- 
litigation methods to apply legal pressure upon The Main 
Line Times to enforce the Fair Housing Act, including filing 
a complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Resources 
Commission (J.A. at 855) and holding a press conference to 
publicize the newspaper's violations of the Fair Housing 
Act. 
 
V. Causation 
 
The district court held, and the majority agrees, that the 
FHC could not show that the alleged injury was caused by 
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any illegal advertisements published by the Main Line 
Times. I disagree. For standing purposes, a plaintiff is 
required to show that its injury is "fairly traceable" to the 
defendant's actions. Public Interest Research Group of New 
Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d 64, 71 (3d Cir. 
1990). Tort causation is not required by Article III, and a 
plaintiff, even at the trial stage, does not have to prove 
injury for standing purposes with scientific certainty. Id. at 
73 n. 10. 
 
The FHC was able to specifically connect the 
advertisements at issue in this lawsuit to the press 
conference. Likewise, the FHC was able to associate its 
investigation and litigation injuries to the specific 
advertisements that were the ultimate subject of the 
lawsuit. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
For all the foregoing reasons, including the reasons set 
forth in my Montgomery Newspapers dissent, I conclude 
that the FHC has standing to advance a claim under 42 
U.S.C. S 3604(c). I would reverse the district court and 
reinstate the $25,000 verdict in favor of the FHC and 
against The Main Line Times. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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